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ABSTRACT: In June 2005, the FDA approved BiDil, a heart failure medication
that is labeled for useonly by African-Americans and thus, is the first treatment of
its kind. The drug likely portends a future of growing interest in “race-based”
medicine. This phenomenon is emerging at the same time that scientists, in light
of the Human Genome Project, are reaching an understanding that “race” has no
biological meaning, and consequently, “racially-tailored” medicine is both
puzzling and troubling.
This Article explores the reasons for the new focus on “racial-profiling”
in medicine. It analyzes the risks and dangers of this approach, including
medical mistakes, stigmatizations, discrimination, exacerbation of health
disparities, and violation of anti-discrimination mandates. The author does not
argue against the pursuit of attribute-based therapies, but cautions that the
attribute or attributes at issue must be carefully determined and will not be
equivalent to what is conventionally thought of as “race.” The article develops
recommendations for safeguards that should be implemented by scientific review
boards, IRBs, researchers, health care providers, and journalists involved with
attribute-based research and therapeutic practices to ensure that this new
approach promotes rather than diminishes public health and welfare.
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INTRODUCTION
F.D.A. Approves a Heart Drug for African-Americans.1 This June 2005 headline
announced the arrival of BiDil, a heart failure medication that is approved for AfricanAmericans only.2 BiDil is the first drug in pharmaceutical history thatwill constitute
standard therapy for only one particular “race.”3
Health care professionals are becoming increasingly interested in “race-based”
medicine in the research and therapeutic contexts.4 Many researchers are attempting to
discern “racial” differences in disease manifestation, biological functioning, and
therapeutic response rates.5 As this approach develops, physicians may prescribe
different dosages of medication for people of separate “races”6 or may provide them with
entirely different drugs. In light of the success of BiDil, investigators are also likely to
1

Stephanie Saul, F.D.A. Approves a Heart Drug for African-Americans, N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 2005 at C2.
Id.
3
Id. See also infra Part II.A.
4
C. Condit & B. Bates, How lay people respond to messages about genetics, health, and race, 68 CLIN.
GENET. 97, 97 (2005) (stating that “[t]here is a growing movement in medical genetics research and
practice to develop, implement, and promote a model of race-based medicine”).
5
See infra Part II.B.
6
Sally Satel, I Am a Racially Profiling Doctor, N.Y. TIMES, May 5, 2002 § 6 (Magazine), at 56.
2
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pursue the development of additional “racially-tailored” medications. In fact, several
academic and professional conferences have already devoted significant time to the
discussion of “race-based” medicine. On April 18, 2005, the University of Minnesota
hosted a conference entitled Proposals for the Responsible Use of Racial & Ethnic
Categories in Biomedical Research: Where do we go from here?7 Likewise, the eighth
world congress on clinical pharmacology and therapeutics, held in 2004 in Brisbane,
Australia, devoted an afternoon to ethnopharmacology.8
While “racial profiling” in medicine has generated significant discussion in
medical and bioethics circles, it has thus far gained relatively little attention in the legal
literature.9 This Article aims to develop the discourse concerning this important topic. It
argues that “race-based” medicine is an inappropriate and perilous approach. The
argument is rooted partly in the fact that based on medical science, the social sciences,
and the law, the concept of “race” is elusive and has no reliable definition.10 Does “race”
mean color, national origin, continent of origin, culture, or something else? What about
the millions of Americans who are of mixed ancestral origins – to what “race” do they
belong?11 To the extent that “race” means “color” in colloquial parlance, should
physicians decide what testing to conduct or treatment to provide based simply on their
visual judgment of the patient’s skin tone? “Race,” consequently, does not constitute a
valid and sensible foundation for research or therapeutic decision-making.
Further, this Article contends that “racial profiling” in medicine can be dangerous
to public health and welfare.12 A focus on “race,” whatever its meaning in the
physician’s eye, can lead to medical mistakes if the doctor misjudges the patient’s
ancestral identity or fails to recall that a particular condition affects several vulnerable
groups and not just one “race.” The phenomenon can also lead to stigmatization and
discrimination in the workplace and elsewhere if some “races” are perceived as more
diseased or more difficult to treat than others. In addition, “racial profiling” could
exacerbate health disparities by creating opportunities for health professionals to
specialize in treating only one “race” or to provide different and inferior treatment to
certain minorities as well as by intensifying African-Americans’ distrust of the medical
profession. Finally, “race-based” medicine might violate numerous anti-discrimination

7

See conference information available at
http://lifesci.consortium.umn.edu/conferences/categories.php?s=0.
8
Taslin Rahemtulla & Raj Bhopal, Pharmacogenetics and ethnically targeted therapies,
http://bmj.bmjjournals.com/cgi/content/full/330/7499/1036?eaf (2005).
9
A Westlaw search revealed only three major articles by other authors that discuss BiDil. They are: Rene
Bowser, Race As A Proxy for Drug Response: The Dangers and Challenges of Ethnic Drugs, 53 DEPAUL
L. REV. 1111 (2004); Jonathan Kahn, How a Drug Becomes “Ethnic”: Law, Commerce, and the
Production of Racial Categories in Medicine, 4 YALE J. HEALTH L & ETHICS, 101 (2004); and Erik
Lillquist & Charles A. Sullivan, The Law and Genetics of Racial Profiling in Medicine, 39 HARV.C.R.-C.L.
L. REV. 391 (2004).
10
See infra Part III.
11
See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU AMERICAN FACTFINDER, RACE, COMBINATIONS OF TWO RACES, AND NOT
HISPANIC OR LATINO: 2000, available at http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet/QTTable?_bm=y&geo_id=01000US&-qr_name=DEC_2000_S... (disclosing that in the 2000 census almost seven million
Americans indicated that they were members of two or more “races).
12
See infra Part IV.

3

provisions contained in federal law, state law, and federal research regulations and
guidelines.13
The Article does not argue that attribute-based research and treatment
mechanisms should be abandoned. Rather, to the extent that a group-oriented approach is
pursued, it should be attribute-based rather than “race-based,” and scientists should invest
considerable effort in accurately identifying the attribute or attributes at issue. Health
status and treatment response depend on a constellation of factors, all of which must be
considered. The variables that might be relevant for a particular procedure or therapy
could include socioeconomic status, diet, exercise, stress level, exposure to
environmental toxins, cultural and religious barriers to treatment compliance, specific
genetic alterations thatinfluence disease course or vulnerability, and other factors. 14 In
the future, it is likely that affordable genetic technology will be widely available to screen
individuals for thousands of genetic variations.15 It is hoped that the practice of medicine
will become increasingly individualized, with physicians examining patients for multiple
variables that will determine which therapy should be prescribed.16 With careful
attention to accurate identification of the patient groups that will benefit from various
treatment alternatives, attribute-based medicine could undoubtedly make a significant
contribution to public health.
In order to safeguard against the hazards of “racially-tailored” medicine, certain
precautions must be implemented. These involve careful scrutiny on the part of
governmental and institutional reviewers of study protocols,17 vigilance and prudence on
the part of medical practitioners, and restraint on the part of researchers, research
institutions, and the media in communicating information concerning attribute-based
studies and therapies to the public.

13

See infra Part V.
See Ian Hacking, Why Race Still Matters, DAEDALUS Winter 2005 at 102, 109 (stating that BiDil might
be particularly effective for African-Americans because of social factors, such as diet); Alexandra E.
Shields et al., The Use of Race Variables in Genetic Studies of Complex Traits and the Goal of Reducing
Health Disparities, 60 AM PSYCH. 77, 96 (2005) (recommending measurement of “specific social
dimensions known to have an impact on health and health outcomes”); Margaret A. Winker, Measuring
Race and Ethnicity: Why and How?, 292 JAMA 1612, 1614 (2004) (encouraging investigators to measure
a number of different variables, including “socioeconomic status, education, urban vs. rural location, or
income region by ZIP code” in order to determine the true reasons for the outcome at issue).
15
See Michael Malinowski, Law, Policy, and Market Implications of Genetic Profiling in Drug
Development, 2 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 3140-41 (2002) (stating that DNA chips can be used to test
the samples of individuals for the presence of thousand of identified genetic variations and, alternatively, to
screen hundreds of thousands of individuals with a shared phenotype characteristic to isolate and identify
shared genetic expression”).
16
See infra notes 70-71 and accompanying text. By “individualized” I do not mean that different
medications will be developed for each individual patient, since this would obviously be impractical.
Rather, several treatment options will be available (as they often are today), and the selection of the
appropriate alternative will depend on a number of factors (e.g. diet, genetic make-up, prior medical
history, etc.) for which each patient will be examined.
17
See THE CENTER FOR DRUG EVALUATION AND RESEARCH (CDER), CDER HANDBOOK 15-16 (rev. Mar.
16, 1998), available at http://www.fda.gov/cder/handbook/; 21 C.F.R. §§ 56.107-56.111 (2005); 45 C.F.R.
§§ 46.107-46.111 (2005) for details concerning FDA scientific reviews and reviews by Institutional Review
Boards.
14

4

A few notes about terminology are in order. I have argued previously that the
term “race” should be eliminated from the law because it is both meaningless and
pernicious.18 In this paper, the emphasis is different. I will extensively analyze the risks
and dangers of basing medical research and therapeutic decisions on “race.” Because the
concept of “race” is amorphous and not precisely definable, I will place quotes around
the term when its use is necessary to describe existing medical practices or attitudes.
When I can avoid reference to “race” or “racial,” I will speak in terms of “ancestry,”
“population,” “attribute-based” or some other appropriate term.
I have chosen the phrase“attribute -based medicine” to describe an approach that
is preferable to “race-based” medicine. The attributes upon which researchers and health
care providers might focus include genetic makeup, socio-economic status, health habits
such as diet, exercise, or smoking, religious and cultural beliefs that could constitute
barriers to treatment compliance, ancestry, and other factors.19 These characteristics are
precisely and objectively definable, and their presence or absence in individuals can be
verified through testing or inquiry. While “race” could be considered an attribute, I will
explain at length why it should not be the focus of medical research and practice.
The Article will proceed as follows. Part II of the Article will describe “racebased” research and therapeutic practices and will examine the growing interest in “racebased” medicine and the reasons for it. Part III will argue that “race” is a concept that
has no coherent meaning and that is potentially pernicious. Part IV will detail the
dangers of “racially-tailored” medicine, and Part V will establish that the practice can
potentially violate a variety of anti-discrimination mandates. Finally, Part VI will detail
recommendations for the development of attribute-based medicine in a manner that will
promote the health and welfare of all population groups.
II
“RACE-BASED” RESEARCH AND THERAPEUTIC PRACTICES
A.

The Story of BiDil

BiDil is a combination of two drugs, hydralazine and isosorbide dinitratre (H/I).
These drugs are vasodilators that dilate blood vessels in order to diminish the stress on
the heart as it pumps blood.20 BiDil also is believed to increase nitric oxide levels in the
blood, which benefits many heart failure patients.21
The evolution of BiDil began with the first Vasodilator Heart Failure Trial (VHeFT I), which was conducted from 1980 to 1985 and found that the H/I drug
combination (BiDil’s components) reduced mortality, though the results were of

18

Sharona Hoffman, Is There A Place for Race As A Legal Concept? 36 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 1094 (2005).
“Population” does not necessarily mean “inhabitants.” It can also be defined as a “set of individuals,
items, or data from which a statistical sample is taken.” WEBSTER’S II NEW COLLEGE DICTIONARY 859
(1995).
20
Bowser, supra note __, at 1116- 1117.
21
Kahn, supra note __, at 108.
19
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“borderline statistical significance.”22 A second trial, V-HeFT II, took place between
1986 and 1991 and compared the H/I combination to enalapril, an ACE inhibitor.23 This
study showed that enalapril was generally more effective than the H/I combination and
established ACE inhibitors as the drugs of choice for heart failure, though twenty to thirty
percent of congestive heart failure patients could not tolerate them or did not respond to
them and, therefore, were found to be better treated by the H/I combination.24 The VHeFT trials enrolled both Black and White subjects and did not scrutinize or report any
racial distinctions in drug response rates.25 In 1989, Dr. Jay Cohn, one of the trials’
principal investigators, received a patent for the H/I drugs.26 His patent application did
not mention race or indicate that the medications should be targeted for any particular
ethnic population.27
The H/I drugs were combined into one pill, known as BiDil, and Medco, which
had acquired the intellectual property rights to BiDil from Cohn, submitted a new drug
application to the FDA in 1996.28 The FDA, however, voted nine to three against
BiDil’s approval because it lacked confidence in the biostatistical validity of the V-HeFT
studies’ results.29 Medco thereafter allowed its intellectual property rights to revert to
Cohn.30
In an effort to revive the drug, Cohn reanalyzed the V-HeFt data, focusing on
race. In 1999 Cohn and other scientists published a paper in which they wrote that “the
H-I combination appears to be particularly effective in prolonging survival in black
patients and is as effective as enalapril in this subgroup. In contrast, enalapril shows its
more favorable effect on survival, particularly in the white population.”31
In 1999 NitroMed Inc. acquired the intellectual property rights to BiDil from Jay
Cohn.32 NitroMed amended BiDil’s new drug application to seek approval for the use of
BiDil to treat African-American heart failure patients. In 2001 the FDA indicated that it
would most likely approve the drug if a clinical trial proved its efficacy for Black

22

Kahn, supra note __, at 112; Jay N. Cohn et al., Effect of Vasodilator Therapy on Mortality in Chronic
Congestive Heart Failure: Results of a Veterans Administration Cooperative Study, 314 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 1547, 1547 (1986).
23
Jay N. Cohn et al., A Comparison of Enalapril with Hydralazine-Isosorbide Dinitrate in the Treatment of
Chronic Congestive Heart Failure 325 NEW ENG. J. MED. 303, 303-04 (1991). ACE inhibitors are drugs
lower the blood pressure by inhibiting the formation of angiotensin II, a substance that causes the arteries to
constrict. ACE inhibitors relax the arteries, thereby lowering blood pressure and improving the pumping
efficiency of failing hearts. See MEDTERMS MEDICAL DICTIONARY available at
http://www.medterms.com/script/main/art.asp?articlekey=2108.
24
Id. at 307-09; Bowser, supra note __, at 1117, Kahn, supra note __, at 112.
25
Cohn, supra note __, at 303-04.
26
Kahn, supra note __, at 113.
27
Id.
28
Bowser, supra note __, at 1118. In 1994 BiDil was tested to ascertain that it was as effective as the H/I
drugs were when administered separately, and it was found to be efficacious. Id.
29
Id. The following day Medco’s stock plummeted by 25%. Id.
30
Id.; Kahn, supra note __, at 115-16.
31
Peter Carson et al., Racial Differences in Response to Therapy for Heart Failure: Analysis of the
Vasodilator-Heart Failure Trials, 5 J. CARDIAC FAILURE 178, 182 (1999).
32
Bowser, supra note __, at 1119. NitroMed is a “Boston area biotech firm specializing in the
development and commercialization of nitric oxide enhanced medicines” to treat heart disease. Id.
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patients.33 This conditionalpromise led to the African -American Heart Failure Trial (AHeFT), which enrolled 1050 self-identified African-Americans34 and was supported by
the Association of Black Cardiologists and $31.4 million raised from private venture
capital firms.35
On October 15, 2002, Cohn and his co-author, Peter Carson, obtained a new
patent for the use of BiDil to treat African American patients and assigned the patent
rights to NitroMed.36 The patent is “the first ever granted to a preexisting drug for a new,
race-specific use.”37 While Cohn’s original 1989 patent for the H/I drugs is scheduled to
expire in 2007, the second, race-based patent will not expire until 2020.38
The study was halted early when it became evident that the addition of BiDil to
standard therapy reduced “relative one-year mortality” by forty-three percent among the
Black study participants.39 The investigators determined that it would be unethical to
continue to deprive subjects in the control arm of the drug.40 The study results were
published in the prestigious New England Journal of Medicine in November 2004,41 and
BiDil was approved by the FDA in June 2005.42 The emergence of BiDil may well usher
in a new era of racially-tailored medicine.
B.

Race-Based Research

The question of whether there are biological and medical differences among
members of different races has long fascinated scientists.43 Biomedical researchers have
conducted numerous clinical studies that focus on racial differences in disease
manifestation, metabolism, and treatment response rates. Moreover, even when studies
are not designed specifically to examine racial differences, data about the racial identities
of subjects is nevertheless collected.44 Many of the findings, however, are controversial
and are vigorously debated in medical circles.
For example, a 1999 study claimed that Blacks metabolize nicotine more slowly
than Whites.45 Critics have argued that the study enrolled only fifty-one Blacks, that
33

Gregg M. Bloche, Race-Based Therapeutics, 351 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2035, 2036 (2004).
Anne L. Taylor et al., Combination of Isosorbide Dinitrate and Hydralazine in Blacks with Heart
Failure, 351 NEW ENGL. J. MED., 2049, 2049 (2004).
35
Nicholas Wade, Race-Based Medicine Continued…, N.Y. TIMES, November 14, 2004, at § 2, p. 12.
36
Kahn, supra note __, at 118, 131-32; Bloche, supra note __, at 2036.
37
Bloche, supra note __, at 2036.
38
Id.
39
Taylor, supra note __, at 2049; Wade, supra note __, at 12
40
Wade, supra note __, at 12.
41
Taylor, supra note __, at 2049. The study has not been replicated by anyone without financial interests
in BiDil.
42
Saul, supra note 1, at C2.
43
See infra Part III.A.
44
See Kahn, supra note __, at 116 (stating that “the V-HeFT investigators had been tracking data by race
from the outset” long before they conceived of BiDil as a racially-tailored drug). The observation that race
identification data is routinely collected in clinical trials is confirmed by the author’s personal experience as
a member of an IRB.
45
Neal L. Benowitz et al., Ethnic Differences in N-Glucuronidation of Nicotine and Cotinine, 291 J.
PHARMACOLOGY & EXPERIMENTAL THERAPEUTICS 1196 (1999). The study included 108 volunteers, 51 of
whom were black and 57 were white. The subjects were “of similar age, gender distribution, and smoking
history.”
34
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Blacks are far more likely than whites to smoke menthol brands thereby skewing the
comparison, and that the statistical difference was insubstantial.46
Other studies have focused on hypertension and have purported to find that
Blacks have higher rates of hypertension.47 Upon careful scrutiny, however, it becomes
evident that while African-Americans do demonstrate higher blood pressure
measurements than North American Whites, Whites have higher levels than Nigerians
and Jamaicans, and the data from Brazil, Trinidad, and Cuba show a much smaller blood
pressure disparity than the statistics from North America. Overall, in the populations
studied, between fourteen to forty-four percent of Blacks were found to have
hypertension, while in Whites the prevalence rate ranged from twenty-seven to fifty-five
percent.48 Another epidemiological study found that even among African-Americans
there are notable hypertension differences, with darker skinned American Blacks
manifesting more serious symptoms than lighter skinned Blacks.49 The researchers
concluded that the differences could be explained by socioeconomic factors, since those
with darker skin in America suffer more discrimination and deprivation than those with
lighter skin.50
In 1999 Peter Carson, Daniel Dries, and others coauthored a study whose results
indicated that “there may be differences in the natural history of . . . left ventricular
dysfunction between black and white patients” and thus in the evolution of progressive
heart failure.51 The authors also asserted that “[t]he population-based mortality rate from
congestive heart failure is 1.8 times as high for black men as for white men and 2.4 times
as high for black women as for white women.”52 This study has been sharply criticized
for failing to control adequately for socio-economic factors53 and for reaching erroneous
statistical results. Specifically, critics note that the study relied on data from 1981 even
though the gap between Black and White mortality rates had significantly narrowed
between 1980 and 1995.54 Furthermore, the study examined only individuals between the
ages of thirty-five and seventy four, even though among whites who die of heart failure,

46

Bowser, supra note __, at 1125 (stating that “there was only an 8% difference in the variable of
interest”). The author claims that 57 of the subjects were African-American, but has apparently inverted
the number of Black and White participants.
47
Richard S. Cooper et al., An international comparative study of blood pressure in populations of
European vs. African descent, 3:2 BMC MEDICINE (2005) available at
http://www.biomedcentral.com/1741-7015/3/2; Troy Duster, Race and Reification in Science, 307 SCIENCE
1050, 1050 (2005); Gregory M. Lamb, A place for race in medicine? THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR,
March 3, 2005, at 14.
48
Duster, supra note __, at 1050; Cooper, supra note 47.
49
Michael J. Klag et al., The Association of Skin Color With Blood Pressure in US Blacks With Low
Socioeconomic Status, 265 JAMA 599, 599 (1991).
50
Id. at 602.
51
Daniel L. Dries et al., Racial Differences in the outcome of Left Ventricular Dysfunction, 340 NEW ENG.
J. MED. 609, 616 (1999).
52
Id. at 609.
53
Kahn, supra note __, at 119-120.
54
Id. at 120; Jonathan Kahn, Getting The Numbers Right, 46 PERSPECTIVES IN BIOLOGY AND MEDICINE
473, 477 (2003).
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seventy-one percent do so after the age of seventy-four.55 According to one
commentator, current data places “the age-adjusted ratio of black to white mortality from
heart failure at something under 1.1:1 for 1999.”56
In the world of “racially-tailored” research, the A-HeFT trial is a milestone.57 It
was the first study that was designed specifically to prove the efficacy of a drug that
would be recommended only for members of one “race.”58 The A-HeFT study has been
particularly controversial.59 The trial included only self-identified African-Americans
and compared a combination of BiDil and standard therapy (which includes ACE
inhibitors) to standard therapy alone for this population.60 No trial has ever compared a
combination of BiDil and ACE inhibitors to standard therapy among all populations, and
therefore, according to critics, it is erroneous to conclude that BiDil combined with
conventional therapy is the treatment of choice only for African-Americans.61 The VHeFT trials that preceded A-HeFT62 compared BiDil, on its own, to conventional therapy
that was used in the early 1980s and then to enalapril (an ACE inhibitor) alone.63 No
previous trial ever tested a combination of BiDil and Ace inhibitors. Consequently, if
non-Blacks are not given BiDil together with ACE inhibitors because the FDA has not
approved it for them, they might be deprived of a beneficial treatment.64 On the other
hand, if doctors prescribe BiDil off-label65 to non-Black patients, which might be what its
manufacturers hope for, these individuals will be receiving a drug combination that was
never tested within their population group.
C.

A Growing Interest in “Race-Based” Medicine: Why Now?

55

Kahn, supra note __, at 121; Kahn supra note 54, at 477; Duster, supra note __, at 1050 (noting that the
“age group 45 to 64 only accounts for about 6% of heart failure mortality, and for those over 65, the
statistical difference between ‘African-Americans and Caucasians’ nearly completely disappears”).
56
Kahn, supra note __, at 121. See also, Kahn supra note 54, at 477.
57
See supra Part II.A.
58
Bloche, supra note __, at 2035; Susan J. Landers, New drug combo intensifies race-based medicine
debate, AMNEWS, Dec. 6, 2004, available at http://www.amaassn.org/amednews/2004/12/06/hl111206.htm. Other trials have been conducted to compare treatment
outcomes between Black and non-Black patients with therapies that are marketed to all population groups.
See e.g. Jackson T. Wright, Jr. et al., Outcomes in Hypertensive Black and Nonblack Patients Treated with
Chlorthalidone, Amlodipine, and Lisinopril, 293 JAMA 1595 (2005) (finding that “[w]hile the improved
outcomes with chlorthalidone were more pronounced for some outcomes in blacks than in nonblacks,
thiazide-type diuretics remain the drugs of choice for initial therapy of hypertension in both black and
nonblack hypertensive patients”).
59
Pilar Ossorio & Troy Duster, Race and Genetics, 60 AM. PSYCH. 115, 116 (2005) (“The racialized nature
of the BiDil trial and marketing is highly contested terrain”).
60
Taylor, supra note __, at 2049.
61
Bloche, supra note __, at 2035; Kahn, supra note 54, at 481.
62
See supra Part II.A.
63
See supra Part II.A; Bowser, supra note __, at 1117. In the early eighties ACE inhibitors were not used.
64
Bloche, supra note __, at 2036; Kahn, supra note 54, at 481; Jonathan Kahn, Misreading race and
genomics after BiDil, 37 NATURE GENETICS 655 (2005); Saul, supra note __, at C2.
65
Off-label use of a drug is a use that was not explicitly approved by the FDA. Thus, a drug that was tested
only on African-American adults and approved by the FDA only for use by this population, could be
prescribed for Whites or children. See Dale E. Hammerschmidt, Understanding the FDA’s IND Process in
INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARDS: MANAGEMENT AND FUNCTION 324 (2002).
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As will be discussed below, scientists are developing an understanding that “race”
is not a biological feature.66 At the same time, however, there is also renewed and
increasing interest in “racially-tailored” medicine.67 One must wonder why this is so.
One response is that this approach holds true promise for patients, whose
treatment will thereby be considerably improved.68 Skeptics might point out, however,
that there are also academic, commercial, and regulatory incentives to pursue “racialprofiling” in medicine.
The mapping of the human genome was achieved in 2003 as a result of the
Human Genome Project.69 The question now is how will the knowledge gained be
applied to improve human health? There is much hope that it will ultimately lead to
individualized genomic medicine, whereby physicians can test individual genetic samples
to determine what treatment is best for each person.70 This advance, however, is years if
not decades away from becoming practical and widely accessible.71 In the interim,
developing a few different “race-based” treatment protocols that are justified by apparent
“racial” disparities in treatment response rates might seem like a reasonable step in the
right direction.72 Critics, however, would argue that “race” is a crude and inaccurate
marker and that its use will lead to medical mistakes and potential exacerbation rather
than alleviation of health disparities.73
Pharmaceutical companies are also likely to be enthusiastic about developing
certain “racially-tailored” drugs. If a particular manufacturer can produce a drug that is
marketed as the medication of choice for all Black, Asian, or Hispanic patients, it will be
able to capture a significant percentage of the market and divert it away from competitors
who produce the standard therapy. Moreover, drug companies engaging in research and
development that is specifically designed to improve treatment outcomes for a minority
66

See infra Part III.A. See also THE UNEQUAL BURDEN OF CANCER: AN ASSESSMENT OF NIH RESEARCH
AND PROGRAMS FOR ETHNIC MINORITIES AND THE MEDICALLY UNDERSERVED 38 (M. Alfred Haynes &

Brian D. Smedley ed. 1999) (stating that “race” is not a biological reality but rather, a “social or cultural
construct of human variability based on perceived differences in biology, physical appearance, and
behavior”).
67
Condit & Bates, supra note __, at 97.
68
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Asians”).
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group might be able to obtain financial and political support for their endeavors, which
would not be available for ordinary clinical studies.74
By extension, regulatory advantages might also motivate pharmaceutical
companies to pursue the development of “racially-tailored” medicine. Health disparities
between Whites and Blacks in the U.S. have been the subject of much commentary and
debate in recent years and have fueled a governmental interest in formulating an effective
response.75 Guidelines issued by the National Institutes of Health (NIH) emphasize the
importance of gathering data concerning treatment response differences among various
minority groups in order to achieve “change in health policy or standard of care.”76 The
NIH might thus be especially interested in funding research projects with potential to
improve the health status of a minority group. The NIH guidelines also require the
reporting of “racial” and ethnic treatment response differences.77 The policy may thereby
encourage investigators to attribute differences to “race” and to respond to them in future
projects by developing “racially-tailored” therapies.78
Similarly, the FDA might be particularly willing to approve therapies that are
depicted as likely to reduce health disparities. In the case of BiDil, NitroMed obtained
the support of the Association of Black Cardiologists and the Congressional Black
Caucus for purposes of obtaining FDA approval of the drug, and the FDA, which had
declined approval when BiDil was presented as an alternative therapy for all populations,
approved it as a drug for African-Americans despite vocal criticism on the part of some
experts.79 It is also noteworthy that the United States Patent and Trademark Office
(PTO) issued a “race-based” patent for BiDil even though an earlier patent already
existed for the drug as a non- “racially-tailored” medication.80 Consequently, scientists
may have incentives to conduct research that will prove the efficacy of a therapy in a
particular population in order to seek new “race- specific” patents for existing products.
This Article does not argue that attribute-based medicine should be abandoned.
Rather, it argues only that it is extremely important to identify accurately the attributes
74

Kahn, supra note __, at 123, 145 (reporting that NitroMed obtained the support of the Association of
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Matter, 24 HEALTH AFFAIRS 343 (2005); David Satcher et al., What If We Were Equal? A Comparison of
The Black-White Mortality Gap in 1960 and 2000, 24 HEALTH AFFAIRS 459 (2005) Mary Crossley, Infected
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that are relevant for the proposed medical protocol. For this reason, the correct questions
must be asked about the characteristics that are responsible for distinguishable disease
vulnerabilities or treatment response rates. Is the difference based on geographic origin?
Is it a specific genetic variation? Or is it socio-economic status that causes individuals to
have poor nutrition, little opportunity for exercise, and excessive stress? Or is it a
combination of factors? The concept of “race” is not helpful in this regard. Although it
is likely to be more costly to consider all of the relevant factors rather than relying on the
proxy of “race,” doing so is the only responsible way to proceed with medical research
and to achieve accurate research outcomes. As will be developed in the next section,
because “race” is incoherent and undefinable, medical researchers and practitioners
cannot rely on it as a conclusively illuminating attribute for medical purposes.
III
DOES “RACE” MEAN ANYTHING?
This Article argues against substantial use of the concept of “race” in medical
settings. A primary reason for this restriction is that “race” has no coherent meaning,
and, therefore, reliance upon it for research or treatment purposes can be confusing at
best and lead to significant adverse consequences at worst. This section will build the
argument that based on medical science, the social sciences, and the law, “race” has no
reliable definition or real meaning. Moreover, it is a pernicious concept that has been
used to suggest that human beings can be divided into subspecies, some of which are
morally, intellectually, and physically inferior to others. Thus, care givers should focus
on more precise and meaningful aspects of human identity rather than on the amorphous
concept of “race.”81
A. “Race” in the Medical and Social Sciences
As early as 1937 Jacques Barzun wrote that “[a]mong the words that can be all
things to all men, the word race has a fair claim to being the most common, the most
ambiguous, and the most explosive.”82 “Race” has been defined as a biological feature;83
a local geographic population;84 a group linked by common descent or origin;85 a
population connected by a shared history, nationality, or geographic distribution;86 a
“subspecies”;87 and a social and political construct.88 The word “race” has also been used
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For a more extensive discussion of these arguments, see Hoffman, supra note 18.
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Disparities Research, 1 YALE J.L. & POLITICS 33, 39 (2001).
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L.J. 17, 31 (1999); Miranda Oshege McGowan, Diversity of What? in RACE AND REPRESENTATION:
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 237, 238 (1998).
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interchangeably with “ethnicity,” “ancestry,” “culture,” “color,” “national origin,” and
even “religion.”89
During the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, scientists attempted to classify
racial groups through assessment of physiological characteristics. Samuel Morton, a
prominent Philadelphia physician, collected over 800 skulls from around the world.90
From these, he attempted to calculate the skull capacities of different “races,” not
surprisingly finding that Caucasians ranked highest, Native Americans ranked lower, and
Blacks placed last.91 Morton’s results have been discredited by contemporary scholars,
such as Stephen J. Gould, who have pointed out, for example, that skull size corresponds
to body size and that body size does not necessarily correspond with intelligence level.92
The Nazis focused on the science of “race” with renewed intensity. In order to
identify Jews and Gypsies, who were targeted for extermination, they scrutinized hair and
eye color, the shape of nostrils, the skull, jaws, earlobes, posture, the position of feet at
rest, and even gait.93 Visitors to contemporary Holocaust museums can often see
photographs of Nazi doctors measuring various features on people suspected of being
Jews or Gypsies.
Of particular interest in the early twenty-first century, following the completion of
the Human Genome Project’s mapping of the human genome,94 is the question of
89

See Soo-Jin Lee, supra note __, at 54; Fukarai, supra note 88, at 31; ALAIN F. CORCOS, THE MYTH OF
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Discourse, 38 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 629, 631, 638 (1998); Atwood D. Gaines, Race and Racism, in
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BIOETHICS 2193-2194 (Warren Thomas Reich ed. 1995); Ortiz v. Bank of America, 547
F.Supp. 550, 560 (1982) (stating that “the notion of ‘race’ as contrasted with national origin is highly
dubious”).
A U.S. study involving lay person focus groups concluded that African-Americans are more likely
to have a broad and malleable understanding of “race,” which includes notions of self-identification and
culture. Tasha N. Dubriwny et al., Lay Understandings of Race: Cultural and Genetic Definitions, 7
COMMUNITY GENETICS 185, 185, 194 (2004). The study involved 120 participants, including seven focus
groups consisting of self-identified African Americans, seven groups of self-identified Whites, and one
group of self-identified Hispanics. The participants were recruited from urban, suburban, and rural areas in
Georgia. Id. at 186. By contrast, European-Americans were more likely to understand “race” in terms of
physical characteristics, genetics, and geography. Id. at 185, 194.
90
WILLIAM H. TUCKER, THE SCIENCE AND POLITICS OF RACIAL RESEARCH 18 (1994).
91
Id. (citing SAMUEL MORTON, CRANIA AMERICANA (J. Dobson 1839)). Morton attempted to develop a
scientific method for his study. He filled the skull cavity with white pepper seeds that he then transferred
to a tin cylinder from which he read the volume of seeds in cubic inches. Id. He also repeated the
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whether “race” is a genetically valid concept. Scientists estimate that human beings share
98.56 percent of their genes with chimpanzees.95 Human beings have approximately
30,000 to 35,000 genes,96 and 99.9 percent of genes are identical in allindividual s.97
While there is variation in the remaining one tenth of a percent, ninety to ninety-five
percent of variations, which are called alleles,98 are found at equal rates in every “racial”
population.99 Consequently, only five to ten percent of all genetic variations (in the onetenth of a percent of genes that actually vary) are distributed along geographical or
continental lines.100 This can be explained by the fact that human beings had to adapt to
very different climates in different regions, and certain features, such as light or dark
skin, are advantageous for particular environmental conditions.101
Recently, researchers have been able to classify individuals into clusters based on
similarities in particular sections of their genetic codes, and these classifications
correspond statistically to the “races” by which those tested identified themselves. One
study, led by Neil Risch, involved 3,636 subjects who identified themselves as White,
African American, East Asian, and Hispanic.102 Researchers analyzed three hundred
twenty six microsatellite markers in their DNA samples and found that the analysis
produced four major clusters that overwhelmingly corresponded to the subjects’ selfidentified “race.”103 These results, however, can be achieved only if the study includes
participants whose recent ancestors allcome from one distinct geographic area.104
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Furthermore, the clustering can only be achieved through examination of microsatellites,
which constitute a particular “class of non-functional DNA” that are “not typical of
genes” but are selected because they are “`maximally informative’ about group
differences.”105
Significantly, among the five to ten percent of variants in the tenth of a percent of
variable genes that seem to be distributed differentially between geographical
populations, there are no variants that are found in all members of one population group
and not in any members of a different population group.106 In addition, commentators
emphasize that intra-group genetic variation is dramatically greater than inter-group
variation.107 Furthermore, Black people originating in Africa demonstrate more genetic
variation than do people with recent ancestry from any other continent, so that two Black
individuals are likely to be more dissimilar genetically than two members of any other
“race.”108
Moreover, variation in genetic makeup and physical features is gradual and
continuous, so it is impossible to demarcate where one “race” ends and another begins.109
For example, skin color, produced by a pigment called melanin,110 slowly changes from
one region to another so that people whose geographic distance from one another is small
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tend to look more alike than those living far apart.111 Also, individuals who share skin
color often have radically different ancestries, as is the case for sub-Saharan Africans,
New Guinea highlanders, and Australian aborigines, so that skin color, as a proxy for
“race,” is an extremely unreliable indicator.112
Like medical scientists, anthropologists and sociologists have long debated the
significance of “race.”113 The American Anthropological Association (AAA) issued a
1997 statement urging the federal government to discontinue its use of the term “race” in
the gathering of data, because “‘race’ has been scientifically proven to not be a real,
natural phenomenon.”114 This position was articulated even more emphatically in 1998,
when the AAA wrote that “[t]he ‘racial’ worldview was invented to assign some groups
to perpetual low status, while others were permitted access to privilege, power, and
wealth.”115
In 2003, the American Sociological Association (ASA) issued its own statement
on “race.”116 The ASA noted that “race” has a significant impact on individuals’
educational opportunities, employment, health status, place of residence and treatment
within the social justice system.117 Consequently, the organization urged the continued
pursuit of scholarship concerning “race,” asserting that “[r]efusing to acknowledge the
fact of ‘racial’ classification, feelings, and actions, and refusing to measure their
consequences will not eliminate “racial” inequalities. At best, it will preserve the status
quo.”118 The ASA, however, did not address the biological validity of “race” or attempt
to define the concept’s meaning.
B. Race and the Law
During the eras of slavery and segregation, state legislatures struggled to create
bright line rules in order to categorize people as White and Black.119 Different states
developed the one-quarter rule, the one-eighth rule, the one-sixteenth rule, the one-thirty111
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second rule, and the infamous one drop rule.120 Thus, a person could be considered
White in one state and Black in another.
The courts also struggled to define who was White and who was non-White for
purposes of determining questions of status, rights, and benefits.121 Predictably, the
courts did not construct any systematic methodology for making these determinations.122
A published study of sixty-eight nineteenth century cases that were appealed to Southern
state supreme courts showed that “race” was often determined as much by the way an
individual “performed Whiteness” as by appearance, “blood,” or other presumably
scientific evidence.123 Thus, courts often called for “reputation evidence,” judging men
by their exercise of good citizenship, gentleman-like behavior, and fulfillment of
obligations in the public sphere and judging women by their apparent purity and moral
virtue.124
The census provides a dramatic example of the fluidity of “racial” categories.
The choices listed in answer to the questions about the respondent’s “race” have changed
from decade to decade since 1870.125 In 1870 the list included only white, colored,
Chinese, and Indian.126 In 2000, respondents could choose from the following “racial”
categories: “White,” “Black, African Am., or Negro,” “Asian Indian,” “Chinese,”
“Filipino,” “Japanese,” “Korean,” Vietnamese,” “Native Hawaiian,” “Guamanian or
Chamorro,” “Samoan,” “Other Pacific Islander,” “Other Asian,” and “Some other
race.”127 It is noteworthy that many of these categories are not “races” in the traditional
sense, but rather, refer to national origin (e.g. Korean, Japanese) or state/territory of
origin (e.g. Native Hawaiian, Guamanian). “Hispanic” is not considered a “race” for
purposes of the census,128 but rather an “ethnicity”129 and is addressed in a separate
question concerning Hispanic identity.130
120
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The categorization of people of mixed “race” has also constituted a conundrum
for the Census Bureau. Until 1980, “multi-racial” individuals were required to identify
themselves by the “race” of their non-White parent.131 In 1990, those who wrote “BlackWhite” in response to the inquiry about “race” were identified as Black, and those who
wrote “White-Black” were classified as White.132 The 2000 census finally included the
option of self-identification by more than one “race.”133 Almost seven million Americans
chose two or more “races” by which to describe themselves.134 According to the Census
Bureau, however, seventy-five percent of those who now identify themselves as Black
could also correctly claim multiracial origins.135 In addition, according to scientists, on
average, African-Americans have an admixture of ten to twenty percent white genetic
ancestry, based on familial lineage.136
C. Shifting the Focus Away from “Race”
When scrutinized carefully and studied through the lens of a number of
disciplines, the concept of “race” has no coherent meaning. Moreover, it is a pernicious
concept that suggests that human beings can be divided into subspecies, some of which
are morally, intellectually, and physically superior to others.137 This misconception has
led to the oppression, subjugation, and even extermination of millions of people, as
evidenced by genocides such as the Nazi Holocaust and the slaughter in Rwanda.138
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note __, at 268.
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Progressive Race Blindness?: Individual Identity, Group Politics, and Reform, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1455
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Even in contemporary intellectual circles, some are promoting theories
concerning the inferiority of the Black “race.”139 For example, in 1994, Richard
Herrnstein and Charles Murray published a book called The Bell Curve: Intelligence and
Class Structure in American Life,140 which focused on the fact that on average, AfricanAmericans score fifteen or sixteen points lower than Whites on IQ tests.141 Instead of
critiquing the validity of IQ tests or the environmental factors that might contribute to the
scoring disparities,142 the authors concluded that this population simply was less
intelligent than others. Furthermore, the authors asserted that the ranks of the destitute,
the criminal, the unemployed, those bearing children out of wedlock, and the socially
maladjusted are populated by the unintelligent, and consequently, by a disproportionate
number of African-Americans.143
A second book, written by Michael Levin, Why Race Matters, went a step
further.144 The book argued that African-Americans are not only typically less intelligent
than Whites, but also are more aggressive, assertive, and impulsive than Caucasians.145
Furthermore, according to the author, Blacks have a different moral orientation from
Whites, are more likely to commit crimes, suffer from an absence of “conscience” and
self-monitoring, and have less free will than Whites.146
It should be emphasized that I do not argue that individuals should stop thinking
of themselves as African-American, White, Hispanic, Jews, etc. These identities are
central and empowering for many people, and I am not arguing that they should be
expunged. However, deeming them to be “race” designations is not useful. More
accurately, these relate to people’s continent of origin, color, national origin, religion, and
culture.
Moreover, because “race” is an incoherent term that eludes clear definition and
because its use reinforces misconceptions about biological differences among human
populations, it should not be the focus of medical inquiry. Rather, in designing research
and providing care, health professionals interested in a patient’s background should
139
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al., Intelligence, Race, and Genetics, 60 Am. PSYCH. 46, 52, 57 (2005) (explaining that “[a]lthough
attempts have been made to establish genes for intelligence . . . none have been conclusively identified,”
that intelligence is “ill defined,” and that “studies currently indicating alleged genetic bases of racial
differences in intelligence fail to make their point”); David C. Rowe, Under the Skin, 60 AM. PSYCH. 60
(2005)
143
HERRNSTEIN & MURRAY, supra note __, at 25-27, 63-64.
144
MICHAEL LEVIN, WHY RACE MATTERS: RACE DIFFERENCES AND WHAT THEY MEAN (1997).
145
Id. at 213.
146
Id. at 213, 322. See also, J. Philippe Rushton, Construct Validity, Censorship, and The Genetics of
Race, AM. PSYCH., January 1995, at 231, 242-247 (defending the concepts of “race” and “race” differences
based on what the author finds to be reliable evidence of differences in “brain size, IQ, violent crime,
testosterone, sexuality, and AIDS.”).

19

consider a combination of factors, among which might be an individual’s ancestry, socioeconomic status, genetic make-up, health habits, cultural beliefs, and others.147
Generally, however, no single aspect of a person’s identity should be the sole basis for
research or therapeutic decisions.
The term “race” obfuscates social discourse, policy-making, and medical
decision-makingbecause it subsum es so many different meanings. In the following
section this Article will analyze the specific hazards of “racially-tailored” research and
therapeutic practices.
IV
THE DANGERS OF “RACIAL PROFILING” IN MEDICINE
A. Medical Mistakes
Reliance on the concept of “race” can lead to unfortunate medical mistakes,
which in turn, can generate medical malpractice claims.148 The problem is obvious in the
diagnostic setting. If sickle cell anemia is thought of only as a “racial” disease that
affects African-Americans, doctors will miss diagnoses in people with ancestry from
Greece, Italy, and the Arabian Peninsula, who are also vulnerable to the illness.149 If
cystic fibrosis is perceived as a disease that affects only people of Northern European
descent, it will go undiagnosed in Black patients.150 Similarly, a recent study examined
counseling concerning testing for BRCA1 and BRCA2, which are largely associated with
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Ashkenazi Jewish women.151 It found that African American women with a first or
second degree relative who had suffered breast or ovarian cancer were far less likely to
get counseling concerning testing for the genetic abnormality than White women, even
though their risk of having BRCA1/2 was no smaller.152
The same concern applies to the treatment setting. Under the currently approved
FDA label, individuals who appear to be non-Black might not be prescribed BiDil, even
though they could benefit from it.153 Therapies that are developed in the future could
similarly be tested on only a limited population group and, therefore, not be validated for
all those who could be aided by them.
Because genetic variations are shared by multiple populations, though at times
they appear in different frequencies, “race” is a crude and unreliable predictor of how an
individual will respond to a particular therapy.154 Furthermore, treatment responses are
often explained by both genetic and environmental influences, including poor diet,
poverty, and excessive stress, which cross population lines.155 Consequently, it is
inappropriate to make facile assumptions about medical treatment and prognosis based on
“race.”
Furthermore, even if “race” were somehow a relevant variable, it is often difficult
to accurately determine a person’s “race.” Health care providers often judge “race”
identity through personal observation or through the patient’s self-identification.156
Because of the growing mixed-origin phenomenon in the Untied States, both of these
methods can be very misleading. Individuals who look White can have eighty percent
West African origins according to their genetic profiles, and those who look Black can
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152
Id. __, at 1729.
153
See Saul, supra note __, at C2.
154
See supra Part III.A; Jorde & Wooding, supra note __ at S32.
155
See Nancy Krieger, If “race” is the answer, what is the question? –on “race,” racism, and health: a
social epidemiologist’s perspective,” available at http://raceandgenomics.ssrc.org/Krieger/ (posted April
20, 2005 as part of Is Race “Real”?, a web forum organized by the Social Science Research Council)
(stating that “[t]he evidence that health varies by socioeconomic position within all US racial/ethnic groups
. . . is substantial and longstanding), citing, among others, David R. Williams and Chiquita Collins, US
socioeconomic and racial differences in health: patterns and explanations” 21 ANNU. REV. SOCIOL. 349
(1995); G. Davey Smith, Learning to live with complexity: ethnicity, socioeconomic position, and health in
Britain and the United States, 90 AM. J. PUBLIC HEALTH 1694, 1697 (2000); Nancy Krieger et al., Painting
a truer picture of US socioeconomic and racial/ethnic health inequalities: The Public Health Disparities
Geocoding Project, 95 AM. J. PUBLIC HEALTH 312, 314 (2005).
156
Wang & Sue, supra note __, at 43. Some physicians may feel uncomfortable asking patients about their
“racial” identity or might believe that their patient’s “race” is obvious and therefore not ask about it.

21

have primarily European ancestry.157 Therefore, those who look White or Black to a
physician may not be so genetically, and those who experience themselves as AfricanAmerican or Caucasian and self identify as such, may be otherwise in genetic terms.
It follows that “racial profiling” is also alarming in the research context.158 If
researchers test a new drug combination only on members of one “race,” the outcome
will be flawed. First, if the subject population is based on individual self-identification,
the study’s results could be skewed because many of the participants will actually be of
mixed origins or predominantly of ancestry other than that which they reported.159
Second, if researchers test a treatment only on one population because of academic,
commercial, or regulatory pressures or in order to facilitate recruitment or save costs and
do not refine their research to determine exactly who will benefit from the therapy
regardless of “race,” they would not be serving the general patient community as ably as
possible.160
B. Stigmatization and Discrimination
Public perception that scientific evidence has established that a particular “race”
is more vulnerable to life-threatening illnesses than others or does not respond to
medications that cure others may reinforce negative race-based stereotypes and
misconceptions.161 Particular populations may be seen as diseased or incurable, which
could fuel the belief that there are inferior human subspecies and biological differences
among “races.”
To illustrate, when testing was first developed for the BRCA1/2 genetic
abnormalities, there was concern among some Jewish advocates that it would lead to
stigmatization. Commentators expressed anxiety that Jews would be generally
considered to have defective DNA or bad genes, and this possibility raised the specter of
the Holocaust and Nazi claims about Jewish inferiority in some minds.162
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Likewise, a study of lay people’s attitudes towards “racially varied
pharmacogenomics,”163 revealed a significant amount of suspicion concerning “racebased prescription” and a preference for individualized genetic testing to determine the
best course of treatment.164 The practice of basing treatment decisions on “race” was
viewed as unwelcome “racial profiling.”165
Stigmatization, in turn, can lead to discrimination in the workplace, and
elsewhere.166 Some employers may seek to avoid hiring or promoting members of
certain “races” because of a fear that they are at high risk of suffering from lifethreatening diseases (e.g. cancer) or that they will be untreatable with conventional
medicine if they are stricken with serious illnesses (e.g. heart disease). Employers will be
concerned about excessive absenteeism, low productivity, and high insurance costs due to
above-average medical expenses.167
More sophisticated employers may try to avoid biased assumptions and actually
test at-risk populations for the presence of genetic abnormalities but may exclude
individuals from employment opportunities based on a misunderstanding of test
results.168 In several documented cases employers singled out Black individuals for
testing for the sickle cell trait, that is, for carrying one copy of the sickle cell gene, even
though carrier status has absolutely no adverse health implications.169 From the early
1970s until 1981, the U.S. Air Force Academy excluded all Blacks with the sickle cell
trait, and commercial air carriers did the same until well into the 1980s.170
In the late 1990s, litigation was brought to challenge another employer’s program
of collecting blood samples from Black employees and testing them for the sickle cell
trait without disclosing that this was the intent of the blood test.171 The Ninth Circuit
163
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held that such testing constituted an invasion of privacy under the California and U.S.
constitutions and a violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 because women
and African-Americans were treated differently from other employees.172 Furthermore,
according to a workplace testing survey conducted in 2001 by the American Management
Association, 1.3 percent of employers acknowledged testing employees for sickle cell
anemia.173 The reported results did not specify whether the employers tested for the
presence of disease symptoms or for the sickle cell trait and did not indicate whether only
African-Americans were tested, though that is presumably the case.
Likewise, health insurers selling individual insurance policies174 might use a
person’s “race” as a mechanism for risk assessment and price-setting despite its
unreliability.175 They may base decisions about issuing health insurance policies or
determining premium amounts on general assumptions concerning the person’s “race”
rather than on individualized assessments. They could, for example, assume that Black
customers are generally at increased risk for high blood pressure or cannot be treated with
inexpensive, conventional therapies for common diseases and, therefore, should be
charged higher premiums or denied coverage altogether.176
C. Exacerbation of Health Disparities
It is theoretically possible that if the practice of medicine becomes increasingly
“racially-tailored,” minorities seeking care in largely White communities will be advised
to go to doctors in other areas, such as economically disadvantaged neighborhoods in the
inner city, who purportedly have more expertise in treating people of their ancestry. Just
as today we have specialists who focus on particular ailments, such as oncologists and
cardiologists, in the future we could have experts who specialize in treating different
“races.” Thus, medical care could become more segregated, and disparities could grow
rather than diminish as a result of the new approach.
Other commentators have further hypothesized that an emphasis on differences
among “racial” groups could encourage health care givers to provide inferior treatment to
minorities, as some are already accused of doing.177 If all patients with a particular
illness cannot be treated the same, and there is no single standard of care, some doctors
might, at least unconsciously, invest more effort and resources in serving White patients,
172
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who can be given familiar, traditional treatments. “Race-based” medicine could also
intensify the distrust that some African-Americans feel towards the medical profession in
the aftermath of the Tuskegee syphilis trial and other scandals.178 African-Americans
might absorb the message that medical professionals view them as biologically distinct
from other groups and are looking for ways to exclude them from receiving mainstream,
standard therapies.
V
VIOLATION OF ANTI-DISCRIMINATION PROVISIONS
“Race-based” medicine might also violate a variety of legal anti-discrimination
mandates, including the Constitution, federal laws, state statutes, federal research
regulations, and National Institutes of Health (NIH) Guidelines. If health care
professionals and medical researchers rely upon the meaningless notion of “race” rather
than basing decisions on more accurate and sound classifications, such as ancestry,
national origin, socio-economic status, health-related habits, or genetic variation, they
may run afoul of the law in a number of ways that are analyzed below.
A. The Constitution and Federal Civil Rights Laws
In a thorough and insightful article, Erik Lillquist and Charles Sullivan analyze a
number of federal anti-discrimination provisions that could be violated by the practice of
“race-based” medicine.179 Nevertheless, while these laws create potential causes of
action for individuals subjected to “racial profiling” in medicine, they are not strong
avenues for redress.
First, the Constitution’s Equal Protection provisions prohibit state and federal
governmental entities from denying individuals the “equal protection of the laws.”180
This prohibition would apply to actions by governmental agencies, public hospitals, and
public research institutions.181 The equal protection mandate might be invoked by
individuals who feel they are treated differently in a medical setting because of their
“race.”
However, plaintiffs asserting equal protection claims against governmental
actors will face the hurdles of immunity. The Eleventh Amendment provides that states
cannot be sued in federal court for constitutional violations.182 Eleventh Amendment
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immunity has been interpreted to extend to cases asserting constitutional claims in state
court as well183 and covers agencies and other arms of the state.184 The amendment bars
all suits for damages or retroactive relief against state governments that are sued by any
party other than a different state or the federal government.185 Likewise, the doctrine of
federal sovereign immunity protects the United States from being sued without its
consent.186 Thus, state or federal institutions, such as hospitals or clinics, could not be
sued for constitutional violations.187
In addition, the defense of qualified immunity shields federal and state
government officials who are performing discretionary functions from liability for civil
damages unless their conduct violates “clearly established statutory or constitutional
rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”188 Consequently, individual
governmental actors can be held liable only if they could be expected to have known that
their actions would result in a violation of constitutional rights. Proving such knowledge
is difficult, though not impossible.
A second federal law provision that might apply to “racially-tailored” medicine is
42 U.S.C. § 1981, which proscribes “race-based” discrimination with respect to contracts
involving either public or private parties.189 Section 1981, however, has rarely been
successfully invoked in health care cases.190 Furthermore, § 1981 plaintiffs must prove
that the alleged wrong occurred in association with a “contract,” which could be a
challenging task, especially in the research context.191
Congress can abrogate the states’ sovereign immunity, but only if it passes legislation under Section 5 of
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Third, Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 disallows “race” discrimination on
the part of federally funded programs even if the funding recipient is a private
institution.192 Nevertheless, Title VI has been held not to apply to doctors receiving
Medicare payments because they are not federally-funded “programs” as defined by the
law,193 though hospitals and long-term care facilities receiving federal funds are
covered.194
Finally, Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964195 forbids discrimination and
segregation in places of public accommodation.196 The provision that defines “a place of
public accommodation,” however, refers specifically to lodging, eating establishments,
gasoline stations, and exhibition or entertainment facilities197 but not to medical
facilities.198 Thus, it is not clear whether health care entities would constitute public
accommodations under the law.199
In short, federal law provides a number of potential causes of action for those
aggrieved by “racially-tailored” medicine, but each has its shortcomings. Thus,
sources other than the federal civil rights laws may provide stronger protection for
patients.
B. State Laws Prohibiting Discrimination in the Medical Arena
A number of different types of state laws prohibit discrimination by health care
providers, some of which could apply to “race-based” medicine.200
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196
The text reads as follows:
All persons shall be entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities,
privileges, advantages, and accommodations of any place of public accommodation, as defined in
this section, without discrimination or segregation on the ground of race, color, religion, or
national origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000a(a) (2003).
197
42 U.S.C. § 2000a(b) (2003).
198
42 U.S.C. § 2000a(b) (2003); Bass v. Parkwood Hosp., 180 F.3d 234 (5th Cir. 1999) (finding that
plaintiff lacked standing to assert a Title II claim against a hospital because even if he could prove that he
suffered covered discrimination, the statute awards only prospective injunctive relief rather than damages,
and he would not suffer continuing harm); Verhagen v. Olarte, No. 89 CIV. 0300(CSH), 1989 WL 146265,
at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 21, 1989) (finding that hospitals are not covered by Title II); United States v. Med.
Soc’y of S.C., 298 F.Supp. 145, 147-48 (D.S.C. 1969) (holding that a hospital was covered partly because
it had a cafeteria and snack bar that served interstate travelers food).
199
Lillquist & Sullivan, supra note __, at 443.
200
See OFFICE OF MINORITY HEALTH, DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY:
ASSESSMENT OF STATE LAWS, REGULATIONS AND PRACTICES AFFECTING THE COLLECTION AND
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1.

Civil Rights Statutes

The majority of states have civil rights statutes that proscribe discrimination
based on race with respect to public accommodations. Arizona’s is a typical statute:
No person shall, directly or indirectly, refuse to, withhold from or deny to
any person… accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof
because of race, color, religion, sex, national origin or ancestry, nor shall
distinction be made with respect to any person based on race, color,
religion, sex, national origin or ancestry in connection with the price or
quality of any item, goods or services offered by or at any place of public
accommodation.201
The states’ definitions of “public accommodation” vary. Twenty states consider
“all establishments which cater or offer their services, facilities or goods to or solicit
patronage from the members of the general public” to be places of public
accommodation.202 One must look to each state’s common law to determine which types
of health care facilities are covered.
Other states are more specific. California forbids discrimination “in all business
establishments of every kind whatsoever.”203 Eleven states include clinics and hospitals
in their statutory definitions of “public accommodation” but exclude private health care
providers or insurance providers.204 Washington state covers any place “where medical
service or care is made available,”205 and Nevada specifies that an “office of a provider of
health care” is a place of public accommodation.206 Finally, the District of Columbia,
Nevada, and Ohio include in their definitions of places of public accommodation insurers
and insurance offices.207

REPORTING OF RACIAL AND ETHNIC DATA BY HEALTH INSURERS AND MANAGED CARE PLANS, available at
http://omhrc.gov/OMH/sidebar/datastats13.htm#phase2.
201
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-1442 (West 2004).
202
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-1441 (West 2004). See also ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-123-102 (Mitchie
Supp. 2003); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46a-63 (West Supp. 2005); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 4502 (1999);
IDAHO CODE § 67-5902 (Mitchie 2001); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-46-2-1 (Mitchie 2004); IOWA CODE § 216.2
(2001); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 344.130 (Banks-Baldwin 2003); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:2232 (West
2003); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 37.2302 (West 2002); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 363A.03 (West Supp.
2005); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 28-1-2, repealed by § 28-1-15 (eff. July 1, 2006) (Supp. 2003); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 14-02.4-02 (2004); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 25, § 1401 (West 1987); OR. REV. STAT. § 659A.400
(2003); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 20-13-1 (Mitchie 1995); TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-21-102 (1998); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 13-7-3 (2001); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 4501 (1993); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 5-11-3 (Mitchie 2002).
203
CAL. CIV. CODE § 51 (West 2003).
204
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24-34-601 (West 2004); HAW. REV. STAT. § 489-2 (1993); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 5, § 4553 (West 2002); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, § 92A (West 2000); MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 49-2-101 (2003); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-5 (l) (West Supp. 2005); N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 40
(McKinney 1992); 43 PA. CONST. STAT. § 955 (Supp. 2004); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-24-3 (2002); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 45-9-10 (Law Co-op Supp. 2004); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 106.52 (1) (e) (1) (West Supp. 2004).
205
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 49.60.040 (West 2002).
206
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 651.050 (Mitchie 2004). See also, N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 354-A2 (XIV) (Supp.
2004) (in New Hampshire a “health care provider” is a place of public accommodation).
207
D.C. CODE ANN. § 2-1401.02 (24) (Supp. 2004); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 651.050 (Mitchie 2004);
OHIO ADMIN. CODE § 4112-5-02 (I) (2002).
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Other state laws are directed specifically at HMOs. To illustrate, Colorado’s
statute establishes that “[n]o HMO shall unfairly discriminate against any enrollee based
on…race.”208
Medical facilities and health care providers who base treatment decisions on their
assumptions about an individual’s “race” may be guilty of violating these civil rights
laws if they cause harm by doing so. A provider who declines to consider various
therapeutic options because of a patient’s apparent “race” may be a covered entity that is
engaging in “race-based” discrimination under state law.209
2.

Hospital And Medical Facility Licensing Requirements

Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and Texas all require that medical
facilities licensed to operate in the state210 agree to provide nondiscriminatory care.
Pennsylvania’s statute, for example, mandates that “no provider shall discriminate in the
operation of a health facility on the basis of race….”211 Rhode Island establishes that
“[p]ersons and other entities providing health services in the state have a duty to provide
those services to any person in need of health services without regard to the person’s
race. . . “ and that violators will be denied certification.212 Other states require
compliance with Patients’ Bill of Rights laws that prohibit racial discrimination as a

208

3 COLO. CODE REGS. § 4-7-2 (YYYY); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 641.22 (4) (West 2005) (“The procedures for
offering comprehensive health care services . . . will not unfairly discriminate on the basis of age, sex, race
. . . .”); MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH–GEN. I § 19-710 (h) (West 2005) (“The procedures for offering health
care services . . . may not discriminate unfairly on the basis of age, sex, race . . . .”); MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. 500.3519 (2) (West Supp. 2005) (A health maintenance organization contract . . . shall not
discriminate on the basis of race . . . .”); N.M. ADMIN. CODE tit. 13, §10.13.22 (A) (YYYY) (No health care
insurer or health care facility or provider through which the health care insurer has made arrangements to
provide health care services shall discriminate against any enrollee by: . . . altering the terms of an existing
health benefits contract and the quality of health care services rendered or to be rendered because of the
enrollee’s: gender, race . . . .”); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 10, § 98-1.11 (YYYY) (requiring that
each HMO shall not discriminate in service provision on the basis of race); N.C. ADMIN. CODE tit. 11, r.
20.0202 (13) (MMM YYYY) (requiring that all contracts between providers and network plan carriers
contain a provision that the provider “shall not discriminate against members on the basis of race . . . .”);
N.D. ADMIN. CODE § 45-06-07-05 (YYYY) (prohibiting HMOs from unfairly discriminating against
enrollees or applicants on the basis of race); S.C. CODE REGS. 69-22 (YYYY) (prohibiting HMOs from
discriminating against any enrollee or applicant on the basis of race); VA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 14, 5-210-80
(C) (1) (YYYY) (prohibiting HMOs from discriminating against any enrollee on the basis of race); W. VA.
CODE ANN. § 33-25D-15 (Mitchie 2003) (prohibiting “prepaid limited health service organization[s]” from
discriminating in the quality of services on the basis of race); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 33-25A-14a (d)
(Mitchie Supp. 2005) (prohibiting HMOs from discriminating in the quality of services on the basis of
race).
209
Similarly, in some states, an insurer that refuses to cover testing or treatment for an individual may be
violating civil rights laws. See infra Part V.B.5.
210
Licensure is typically required “to protect and promote the public health and welfare through the
establishment and enforcement of regulations setting minimum standards in the construction, maintenance
and operation of health care facilities.” 35 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 448.801 (a) (West 2003)
211
35 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 448.804 (a) (West 2003). See also, MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 105, § 130.206
(1994); 25 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 157.16 (d) (9) (2005) (binding emergency medical services providers
only); R.I. CODE R. 14 090 007 (2003) (requiring only that hospitals do not deny admission based on a
patient’s race).
212
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 42-62-11 (1998)
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condition of licensure.213 These statutes bind thefacilities at issue even if they are not
considered places of public accommodation for purposes of civil rights law.
3.

Patients’ Bill of Rights Laws

Several states have Patient Bill of Rights laws that prohibit race discrimination
in health care. Some states passed patient rights laws as individual statutes, 214 while
others placed patient rights provisions within more comprehensive laws.215 The Florida
Patient’s Bill of Rights and Responsibilities is by far the most sweeping law of its kind.
It provides in part that “[a] patient has the right to impartial access to medical treatment
or accommodations, regardless of race, national origin, religion, handicap, or source of
payment.”216 New Jersey’s law guarantees the right “[t]o treatment without
discrimination as to race…”217 but applies only to patients in hospitals, while other laws
cover long term care, surgical centers, and home health agencies.218
Patients who are treated differently from others because of “race-based”
practices and who suffer harm as a result might experience a violation of their rights
under the law. Some patients’ rights statutes expressly authorize a private cause of
action219 or have been deemed by the courts to include a right of private action.220
Other states provide only for administrative enforcement, while still others allow
for patient grievances but fail to empower state agencies to fine violators or provide
meaningful relief to aggrieved parties. In Michigan, while no private right of action
exists,221 patients are entitled to reimbursement by the offending facility upon an
administrative finding of a statutory violation.222 Florida requires that copies of the
213

NEB. ADMIN. CODE tit. 175, ch. 9, § 006 (2005); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 151:21 (Supp. 2004); N.M.
ADMIN. CODE tit. 7, § 7.7.2.19 (2005); N.M. ADMIN. CODE tit. 7, § 7.8.2.34 (2005); N.C. ADMIN. CODE tit.
).
10A, r. 13B.3302 (m) (March 2005); R.I. CODE R. 14 090 007 (2003
214
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 381.026 (West Supp. 2005); KAN. ADMIN. REGS. 28-34-3b; MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. § 333.20201 (West Supp. 2005); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:2H-12.8 (West 2004); N.J. STAT. ANN. §
30:13-3 (West Supp. 2004); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 10, § 405.7 (1996); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
3721.13 (A) (3) (West Supp. 2005) (detailing patient rights for nursing home residents).
215
CODE DEL. REGS. 40-700-014 (2004); CODE DEL. REGS. 40-700-037 (2004); N.D. ADMIN. CODE § 3303-10.1-10 (6) (a) (5) (1998).
216
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 381.026 (West Supp. 2005).
217
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:2H-12.8(p) (West 2004).
218
CODE DEL. REG. 40-700-014 (2004) (long term care); CODE DEL. REG. 40-700-037 (2004) (free
standing surgical centers); KAN. ADMIN. REGS. 28-34-3b (hospitals); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. Tit.
- 10.1 (1998
) (home health agencies).
10, §405.7 (c) (1996) (hospitals); N.D. ADMIN. CODE § 33-03
219
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 30:13-4.2 (West 1997) (providing a cause of action for violation of N.J. Stat. Ann. §
30:13-1 et. seq., which outlines responsibilities and rights of nursing home residents); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 3721.17 (I) (West Supp. 2005) (giving nursing home residents a private cause of action against
“any person or home” committing a violation of nursing home patient’s bill of rights outlined in OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 3721.10 to § 3721.17 (West Supp. 2005)); Sprosty v. Pearlview, Inc., 666 N.E.2d 1180 (ohio
app. 1995), (holding that OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 3721.17 (I) permits an award of punitive damages for
violation of the patient’s bill of rights). See also, Sharon Reece, The Circuitous Journey to the Patients’
Bill of Rights: Winners and Losers, 65 Alb. L. Rev. 17, 91-95 (2001).
220
McDonald v. New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., 203 A.D.2d 6; 610 N.Y.S.2d 13 (1994).
221
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 333.20203 (West 2001).
222
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 333.21799c (4) (West 2001) (stating that the Department of Health must
order a facility in violation of the patient rights law to pay the patient $100.00 or reimburse patient for
injuries or costs, whichever is greater).
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patient’s bill of rights be available to patients, imposes penalties for those who violate
this requirement,223 and enables patients to file grievances with the offending health care
providers or the state licensing agency.224 Hospitals in Kansas must similarly inform
patients of their rights during admission225 and “establish a mechanism for responding to
patient complaints.”226 Delaware patients in long term care facilities can report
mistreatment to the Patient Rights Unit227 or other agencies,228 and medical facilities
must inform them in writing of their right to do so.229 North Dakota’s statute has a
more limited scope, applying only to home health agencies and providing that they be
monitored by the government to ensure compliance with the anti-discrimination
mandate.230
4.

Public Services Regulation

Many states prohibit discrimination on the basis of “race” in the distribution of
state services, including Medicaid. Most of these states prohibit discrimination not only
by state staff at public facilities, but also by any private provider or contractor who
receives state funds to provide medical services and any health care facilities enrolled as
state Medicaid providers.231 The statutes’ wording differs to some extent, with different
laws addressing discrimination in enrollment, the provision of services, access to
services, or separate treatment practices.232
To illustrate, Arizona mandates that “[a] contractor, provider, and nonprovider
shall not discriminate against an eligible person or member because of race . . . .”233
Other states similarly prohibit “race” discrimination in the provision of services or denial

223

Fla. Stat. Ann. § 381.026 (6) (West Supp. 2005) (requiring health care providers to make a copy of the
Patient’s Bill of Rights and Responsibilities available to patients); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 381.0261 (4) (West
2002) (providing for an administrative fine if a health care facility does not make the patient’s bill of rights
available to a patient).
224
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 381.026 (6) (West Supp. 2005) (stating that a patient can air grievances with the
facility or provider serving her, as well as with the state licensing agency when a right has been violated).
225
KAN. ADMIN. REGS. 28-34-3b (10) (YYYY).
226
KAN. ADMIN. REGS. 28-34-3b (10) (b) (YYYY).
227
CODE DEL. REGS. § 40-700-014 (V) (I) (2004) (listing the phone number and address for county Patient
Rights Units).
228
CODE DEL. REGS. § 40-700-014 (V) (1) (2004) (listing the Division of Public Health, State Human
Relations Commission, Dept. of Health and Social Services, and Office of Civil Rights addresses to which
patients can send correspondence regarding discriminatory practices).
229
CODE DEL. REGS. § 40-700-014 (III) (1), (2) (2004).
230
N.D. ADMIN. CODE § 33-03-10.1-10 (6) (a) (5) (2005).
231
See e.g. MO. CODE REGS. ANN. tit. 19, § 10-2.010 (2002) (“This rule specifies civil rights compliance
requirements for all health service providers and contractors who provide services for the Department of
Health and for all hospitals and public health clinics that receive federal financial assistance or
reimbursements for services provided”); ALA. ADMIN. CODE r. 560-X-1-.07 (2) (Supp. 1997) (“Compliance
with Federal Civil Rights and Rehabilitation Acts is required of all providers participating in the Alabama
Medicaid Program”); ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE R9-22-513 (2004) (“A contractor, provider, and nonprovider
shall not discriminate against an eligible person or member because of race .. . .”); GA. COMP. R. & REGS.
r.350-1-.05 (1989) (“[N]o individual shall be excluded from participation, or be denied benefits, or be
subjected to any other form of discrimination by the Department or providers of medical assistance, by
reason of handicap, race, color, sex, age, religion, or national origin”) (emphasis added).
232
See infra note 234.
233
ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE R9-22-513 (A) (2004).
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of benefits.234 Covered physicians and medical facilities that make therapeutic decisions
based purely on a patient’s “race” and thereby cause harm, could be acting in violation of
these laws.
5.

Insurance Codes

A few states explicitly prohibit race discrimination by insurers. Insurers who
refused to cover diagnostic tests or treatments ordered by a health care provider because
they did not consider them appropriate for someone of the patient’s race could be deemed
to have violated these laws. New Jersey, for example, mandates that insurers may not
make or permit any policy “which expresses, directly or indirectly, any limitation or
discrimination as to race, creed, color, national origin or ancestry…”235
234

ALA. ADMIN. CODE r. 56-X-1-.07 (Supp. 1997); ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 7, § 78.130 (2004); ALASKA
ADMIN. CODE tit. 7, § 43.070 (1993); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 26-19-110 (West 2004); CONN. AGENCIES
REGS. § 17b-262-526 (1) (2004); D.C. CODE ANN. tit. 22, § 4405 (YYYY); D.C. MUN. REGS. tit. 22, §
5509 (2005); D.C. MUN. REGS. tit. 29, § 948 (YYYY); D.C. MUN. REGS. tit. 29, § 5319.1 (2004); D.C.
MUN. REGS. tit. 29, § 5413.1 (2004); D.C. MUN. REGS. tit. 29, § 5618 (2004); FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r.
59G-8.100 (23) (2005); GA. COMP. R. & REGS. 350-1-.05 (1989); IDAHO ADMIN. CODE § 16.03.09.026
(2003); 305 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/11-1 (West Supp. 2005); IND. ADMIN. CODE tit. 405, r. 5-1-2
(2005); IOWA ADMIN. CODE r. 441-88.2 (3) (e) (2005); IOWA ADMIN CODE r. 441-152.2 (YYYY); KAN.
ADMIN. REGS. 30-2-1 (2003); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 205.640 (Mitchie 2004); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
46:437.11 (West 1999); MD. REGS. CODE tit. 10, § 09.36.03 (YYYY); MD. REGS. CODE tit. 10, § 09.64.07
(YYYY); MD. REGS. CODE tit. 10, § 09.65.02 (YYYY); MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 130, § 450.202 (YYYY);
MASS. REGS. CODE tit.130, § 501.009 (YYYY); MICH. ADMIN. CODE r. 400.7172 (YYYY); MO. CODE
REGS. Ann. tit. 19, § 10-2.010 (2002); MONT. CODE ANN. § 53-6-105 (2004); MONT. ADMIN. R. 37.85.402
(YYYY); NEB. ADMIN. CODE 2-001.04 (YYYY); N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 10, § 72-1.7 (YYYY); N.M.
ADMIN. CODE tit. 8, § 302.1 (YYYY); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 18, § 515.2 (YYYY); N.C.
ADMIN. CODE tit. 10A, r. 28B.0401 (MM YYYY); OHIO ADMIN. CODE § 5101:3-26-12 (YYYY); OKLA.
ADMIN. CODE § 317:25-7-25 (YYYY); OR. ADMIN. R. 410-120-1380 (YYYY); OR. ADMIN. R. 461-1050010 (YYYY); OR. ADMIN. R. 461-105-0190 (YYYY); 55 PA. CODE § 1101.51 (YYYY); R.I. CODE R. 15
020 001 (YYYY); S.C. CODE ANN. § 126-125 (Law Co-op. YYYY); S.D. ADMIN. R. 67:16:01:18
(YYYY); S.D. ADMIN. R. 67:42:01:13 (YYYY); TENN. COMP. R. & REGS. 1200-13-1-.05 (YYYY); 25
TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 37.67 (West YYYY); 25 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 39.21 (West YYYY); 25 TEX. ADMIN.
CODE § 448.207 (West YYYY); UTAH ADMIN. CODE R414-1 (YYYY); VT. CODE R. 13-170-001 (YYYY);
12 VA ADMIN. CODE § 30-10-970 (West YYYY); WIS. ADMIN. CODE § HFS 104.01 (YYYY); WYO. STAT.
ANN. § 42-4-107 (Mitchie 2003). But cf. OHIO ADMIN. CODE § 5101:3-26-02 (2002) (requiring
nondiscrimination in admissions only).
235
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:29B-4 (7) (c), (d) (West 2004). See also CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1365.5
(West 2000); (stating that terms of a health care service plan contract may “not be modified, and the
benefits or coverage of any contract shall not be subject to any limitations, exceptions, exclusions,
reductions, copayments, coinsurance, deductibles, reservations, or premium, price, or charge differentials,
or other modifications because of the race…of any contracting party.”); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 2304
(22) (a) (2000) (“It shall be unlawful practice for any insurance company licensed to do business in this
state to discriminate in any way because of the insured’s race . . . .”); 215 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/424
(West Supp. 2005) (defining unfair methods of competition and unfair and deceptive acts or practices as:
“Making or permitting, in the case of insurance . . . any unfair discrimination between individuals . . .
because of the race . . . of such insurance risks or applicants.”); ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 50, § 2051.55 (West
YYYY) (requiring that all health insurance preferred provider agreements contain “A provision stating that
the provider will provide health care services without discrimination against any beneficiary on the basis of
) (“A health network may not deny health
. . . ethnicity . . . .”); MD. CODE ANN., INS. § 27-910 (b) (2002
care services to an enrollee on the basis of gender, race . . . .”); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 59A-16-12 (Mitchie
2000) (“No insurer shall, on the basis of the race . . . of any individual or group of persons: . . . treat any
such applicant or insured differently than any other applicant or insured with respect to the terms,
conditions, rates, benefits or requirements of any such insurance contract.”); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
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Nevada’s insurance statute is somewhat narrower and provides that: “[r]isks may
be classified in any reasonable way for the establishment of rates and minimum
premiums, except that classifications may not be based on race, color, creed or national
origin…”236 The statute does not address denial of coverage for particular treatments
based on a patient’s “race.” However, if an insurer issuing individual policies237
attempted to charge African-Americans as a class higher rates or premiums because they
were all perceived as more prone to disease or less easily treatable by standard therapy,
the insurer could be deemed to violate the law.
Nevertheless, state mandates will not protect patients enrolled in self-funded
employee benefit plans238 because under a federal law called the ERISA,239 state laws
regulating insurance are preempted with respect to self-funded plans and cannot be
enforced.240 This exception is quite consequential because a growing number of
employers are self-insured.241
C.

Violation of Research Regulations and Guidelines

The best source of protection for the American public might be NIH guidelines
and federal research regulations that will govern many “racially-tailored” research
studies. Clinical trials that include only one population or deliberately exclude
particular population groups could violate NIH and federal agency rules.
1.

NIH Policy and Guidelines

Researchers seeking NIH funding who include only members of one population
in a clinical trial may violate the NIH Policy and Guidelines on the Inclusion of Women
and Minorities as Subjects in Clinical Research.242 The Guidelines state the following:
1751.18 (2) (West Supp. 2005) (prohibiting any “health insuring corporation, or health care facility or
provider through which the health insuring corporation has made arrangements to provide health care
services” from discriminating against anyone in “the quality of health care services rendered” on the basis
of race); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 58-6-10(2) (Mitchie 2000) (prohibiting government insurers that
discriminate on the basis of race from transacting insurance in the state).
236
NEV. REV. STAT. 686B.060 (2003). See also, ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-67-209 (b) (West 2002); CAL. INS.
CODE § 10140 (West Supp. 2005); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 26-14-105 (b) (Mitchie 2003).
237
See supra note 174 and accompanying text for discussion of group versus individual insurance policies.
238
Employers who choose self funded plans pay their employees’ medical claims on their own rather than
contracting with a commercial insurer that collects premiums and serves as a third party payer. Every
medical claim translates into an out-of-pocket expense for these employers. They are thus known as selfinsured employers. Mark A. Rothstein, The Law of Medical and Genetic Privacy in the Workplace, in
GENETIC SECRETS: PROTECTING PRIVACY AND CONFIDENTIALITY IN THE GENETIC ERA 281, 293 (Mark A.
Rothstein ed., 1997).
239
29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1999).
240
See Sharona Hoffman, A Proposal for Federal Legislation to Address Health Insurance Coverage for
Experimental and Investigational Treatments, 78 OR. L. REV. 203, 241-243 (1999); FMC Corp. v.
Holliday, 498 U.S. 52, 61 (1990) (We read the . . . [statute] to exempt self-funded ERISA plans from state
laws that ‘regulat[e] Insurance . . . .’”).
241
Mark A. Rothstein, The Law of Medical and Genetic Privacy in the Workplace, in GENETIC SECRETS:
PROTECTING PRIVACY AND CONFIDENTIALITY IN THE GENETIC ERA 281, 293. (Mark A. Rothstein ed.,
1997). In 1993, ninety-three percent of employers with more than 40,000 employees were self-insured, as
were eighty-five percent of employers with 5,000-40,000 employees, and thirty-seven percent of those with
50-199 employees. Id.
242
NIH GUIDELINES, supra note __.
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It is the policy of NIH that women and members of minority groups and their
subpopulations must be included in all NIH-funded clinical research, unless a
clear and compelling rationale and justification establishes to the satisfaction of
the relevant Institute/Center Director that inclusion is inappropriate with respect
to the health of the subjects or the purpose of the research. . . . Cost is not an
acceptable reason for exclusion except when the study would duplicate data from
other sources.243
Researchers who seek to exclude particular minority groups from their clinical
studies because they are attempting to develop therapy for a different “racial”
population (e.g. only African-Americans or only Hispanics), risk violation of these
guidelines and denial of NIH funding. Investigators would have to show that there are
valid reasons for excluding all members of a particular minority. Because so many
Americans are of mixed ancestral origin and because genetic variations are shared
across population lines,244 the NIH should rarely, if ever, find a compelling justification
for invoking the exception to the general rule of inclusion. The BiDil trial, for example,
should have been deemed unacceptable if judged under these guidelines because there
was no evidence that African-Americans are the only individuals who could benefit
from a combination of BiDil and standard therapy.245
While NIH’s rule of inclusion is laudable, the NIH guidelines also feature a
more troubling mandate, instructing researchers to report “race/ethnicity differences in
the intervention effect” in appropriate circumstances.246 The guidelines provide the
following choices for “ethnic categories”: Hispanic or Latino and Not Hispanic or
Latino.247 The choices for “racial categories” are: American Indian or Alaska Native,
Asian, Black or African American, Native Hawaiian or other Pacific Islander, and
White.248 The NIH, therefore, encourages research that focuses on “racial” differences
and requires analyses of “race-based” treatment response disparities even in research
that is not intentionally designed to develop “racially-tailored” therapies. This approach
has been criticized by other commentators and ought to be rejected.249 It could
constitute an incentive for sloppy science in which response differences are attributed to
243
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the subjects’ self-selected “racial” identity without deeper analysis of more specific
geographic origins, socio-economic conditions, and other factors.
A better alternative is one that has been adopted by several prestigious
publications, including Nature Genetics and JAMA. Rather than encourage the use of
“racial” categorization, these journals require authors who analyze data by subpopulation, to justify their doing so and to explain how they constructed their
classifications.250 JAMA specifically encourages investigators to measure a number of
different variables, including “socioeconomic status, education, urban vs. rural location,
or income region by ZIP code” in order to determine the true reasons for the outcome at
issue.251 In the words of the Nature Genetics editors, “this will raise awareness and
inspire more rigorous design of genetic and epidemiological studies.”252
2.

Federal Research Regulations

The federal research regulation govern a large portion of research studies that are
conducted in the United States. The FDA regulations apply to clinical trials that are
designed to develop new drugs, medical devices, and biological products, such as
vaccines and blood products.253 Clinical trials that involve treatments other than drugs
and devices, such as surgery or bone marrow transplants, are not within the jurisdiction
of the FDA but are subject to HHS regulation if they are “conducted, supported or
otherwise subject to regulation by any federal department or agency.”254
The federal regulations can be viewed as a further constraint upon “race-based”
research. Both the FDA and HHS regulations instruct Institutional Review Boards
(IRBs) that review and approve research projects255 to pay particular attention to the
selection criteria for human subjects. Specifically, the regulations provide:
Selection of subjects is equitable. In making this assessment the IRB should
take into account the purposes of the research and the setting in which the
research will be conducted and should be particularly cognizant of the special
problems of research involving vulnerable populations, such as. . . economically
or educationally disadvantaged persons.256
Investigators who design “racially-tailored” clinical trials that are federally
regulated risk violating this mandate by selecting enrollees in an inequitable fashion. If
members of only one minority are included in a high-risk study, that minority will
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disproportionately bear the burdens of the research. On the other hand, if the
experimental treatment holds promise of significant benefit for participants, then all but
the members of the selected minority will be deprived of the opportunity to enjoy that
benefit during clinical trials.
Furthermore, if a study focusing on a particular minority will include a large
number of economically or educationally disadvantaged individuals, investigators who
are eager to recruit and retain subjects might be insensitive to their limitations and
vulnerabilities. Extra care must be taken to ensure that potential subjects fully
understand the trial and its implications and are not coerced into enrolling.257 These
concerns will be acute if English is not the subjects’ first language (which may be the
case for many Hispanics or Asians), if there is a placebo control arm in which subjects
will be deprived of standard therapy,258 or if enrollees are offered generous financial
incentives, which some may feel unable to decline.259
D.

Discrimination Theory

The law’s anti-discrimination mandates do not categorically prohibit differential
treatment. Rather, with respect to certain conduct, the law requires that those who wish
to treat individuals differently ask the right questions and do so with adequate
justification. Likewise, attribute-based medicine, which can be discriminatory by nature
if the attributes at issue are possessed primarily by members of a particular protected
class, should not be conducted unless the patient group that will benefit from the
treatment has been carefully and accurately identified.
To illustrate this principle I will focus on a few well- known anti-discrimination
laws and on two provisions that govern biomedical research, as discussed above.260 The
Constitution’s Equal Protection Clause generally prohibits discrimination by
governmental actors261 but allows it when a compelling governmental interest justifies
the conduct at issue, and the conduct is narrowly tailored to achieve the compelling
goal.262 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits employment discrimination
based on race, color, national origin, sex, and religion,263 but allows discrimination
where “religion, sex, or national origin is a bona fide occupational qualification
reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular business or
257
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enterprise.”264 Thus, an employer might be able to discriminate in hiring actors of a
particular gender or national origin for the sake of depicting authentic and believable
characters, to hire only females to serve as attendants in women’s dressing rooms out of
respect for the privacy of female customers, and to employ only male guards in high
security male prisons because of safety concerns.265 The Americans with Disabilities
Act (ADA)266 prohibits employment discrimination based on disability, but authorizes
employers to exclude a candidate or employee if she cannot be reasonably
accommodated by the employer267 or will constitute a direct threat to the health or safety
of himself or others in the workplace.268
In the research arena, the NIH Guidelines mandate inclusion of minorities in
clinical studies unless concern about “the health of the subjects or the purpose of the
research” militates against inclusive selection criteria.269 Similarly, the federal
regulations require equitable selection of subjects but enable IRBs to “take into account
the purposes of the research and the setting in which the research will be conducted” in
evaluating whether subjects are recruited properly.270
While all of the above-described provisions generally constitute antidiscrimination mandates, they allow for selectivity, exclusion, or actions that adversely
affect a protected class under particular, defensible circumstances. Likewise, this
Article does not per se argue against attribute-based medicine. It does, however,
contend that this approach must not be practiced in an irresponsible or unjustifiably
discriminatory fashion. Basing research design or medical decisions solely on an
individual’s “race” is not a sound methodology because “race” does not mean anything
coherent.271 Medical researchers and health care providers must focus on more
sophisticated and revealing classifications. It is clear that there are differences in
treatment responses among individuals, and certainly these individuals can be
categorized into groups. The proper classifications might involve genetic variation,
geographic origin, socio-economic status, diet, exercise, or other factors,272 and if these
are meaningful predictors of illness or appropriate treatment course, they should
certainly be considered. Medical decision-making that is exclusively “race-based,”
however, is contrary to the ethical and legal norms that govern the practice of medicine.
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VI
RECOMMENDATIONS
The advent of BiDil may well portend a future in which attribute-based medicine
is enthusiastically pursued.273 This approach could hold great promise for improving
human health, but it must be embraced cautiously. The following section will delineate
several safeguards that should be implemented in order to address the risks and dangers
of attribute-based medicine.
A.

Review of Research Studies by Scientific Review Boards and IRBs

Prior to allowing a clinical trial involving human subjects to proceed, the FDA
requires the study’s sponsor to submit an investigational new drug (IND) application.274
The proposal then undergoes an extensive scientific review process in which it is
scrutinized by groups with expertise in medicine, chemistry, and
pharmacology/toxicology to ascertain its scientific integrity and safety.275 Thus,
attribute-based drugs or devices will be subjected to scientific review by the FDA. In
addition, some study sponsors conduct their own, internal scientific reviews of research
protocols.276 Finally, most clinical trials must be approved by IRBs, institutional
entities that are charged with responsibility for safeguarding the welfare of research
participants.277 Both scientific review boards and IRBs should subjectattribute -based
studies to particular scrutiny.
1.

Scientific reviews

Scientific review boards should carefully review clinical trials that exclude
particular populations in order to determine whether the trial design is justified by
existing data. The BiDil study, for example, has been criticized for including only
African-Americans and failing to examine whether the combination of BiDil and
standard therapy will benefit non African-Americans.278 Clinical trials should not be
constructed to develop therapy for only one population group unless there is good
reason to believe that others will not benefit from it. Moreover, as discussed below, if
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only one population will be included, the contours of the population should be
thoughtfully and accurately delineated.
Scientific review boards should encourage researchers who will rely on selfidentification for purposes of inclusion criteria to take into account the limitations of this
mechanism.279 In the 2000 census, almost seven million Americans indicated that they
belonged to two or more “races.”280 In addition, many more individuals could consider
themselves to be of mixed origin and have genetic admixtures.281 If a study that is
designed to be population exclusive has numerous subjects with significant ancestral
mixing, its results might be skewed and inaccurate. Moreover, self-identified “race”
alone will rarely if ever be a scientifically valid criterion for study enrollment since it
lacks meaning in genetic and biological terms. As a recent study concluded, “significant
population substructure differences exist that self-reported race alone does not
capture.”282 Researchers who believe that geographic origin might be informative for
research purposes should not only require self-identification but also ask subjects
specific questions about their ancestries in order to gather more accurate information.
Furthermore, scientific review boards should require investigators to formulate
careful hypotheses regarding factors that will influence treatment response. If
applicable, they should control for psychosocial, economic, environmental, cultural,
educational and other non-biological factors that might provide a partial or complete
explanation for treatment response rate differences.283 These might include diet,
exercise, stress, exposure to environmental toxins, or cultural and religious barriers that
can affect protocol compliance.284
A book by Anne Fadiman entitled The Spirit Catches You and You Fall285
highlights some potential social and belief-based hurdles to optimal health care. It
follows an immigrant Hmong family, whose young daughter suffers from severe
epilepsy, through years of encounters with the American medical and social service
systems. Despite everyone’s best intentions, the daughter’s medical treatment fails time
279
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and again. The family has difficulty obtaining adequate translations during doctors’
visits; the doctors, who are eager to improve the youngster’s condition, frequently alter
medication dosages so that the parents are unable to follow the ever-changing
instructions; and some of the parents’ religious beliefs impede both their comprehension
of medical circumstances and their acceptance of particular recommended treatments.286
This experience surely is not unique. Thus, while particular communities that are
involved in clinical trials may demonstrate unusual therapeutic responses, these
phenomena might have nothing to do with biological or genetic characteristics.287
Although controlling for many variables will likely be more difficult and costly than
differentiating subjects based only on “race,” it is the only way to achieve accurate
study outcomes.
2.

Institutional Review Boards

IRBs do not review the scientific validity of clinical trial proposals, but rather,
are entrusted with safeguarding the welfare of human subjects.288 IRBs should be
particularly vigilant when reviewing attribute-based protocols that are targeted at
particular population groups. The federal regulations mandate that the selection of
participants be equitable.289 IRBs, like scientific review boards, should scrutinize
population-specific protocols to ensure that the selection criteria are justified by
scientific data. IRBs must not approve protocols in which one or more minority group
will bear the burden of undergoing experimental treatments unless there is sufficient
reason to believe that the particular minority or minorities will benefit from the therapy
and that other groups are significantly less likely to respond positively to it.290 Thus,
clinical studies should not be limited to minorities without data supporting this decision,
and the mere hope that an experimental medication will turn out to be an attribute-based
drug that will generate high profits for the drug manufacturer should not justify
discriminatory inclusion and exclusion criteria.
The problem is exacerbated if many of the minority subjects are likely to be
economically disadvantaged. If that is the case, the informed consent process should be
tailored to be comprehended by subjects with limited educations.291 The informed
286
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consent process should include extensive verbal explanations, and the informed consent
document should be kept as short as possible, with language that is targeted at an
adequately low reading comprehension level. Furthermore, any financial incentives that
are provided for enrollment must not be so generous that they are too tempting for
potential subjects and thereby essentially coerce enrollment.292
Finally, the informed consent process should clearly disclose to subjects that the
clinical study is limited to particular population groups. Some individuals may be
concerned about potential stigmatization, discrimination, or other adverse consequences
of ancestry-based medical research and practice293 and thus, will consider this
information essential to their decision-making process.
B.

Investigators and Health Care Providers

The above discussion of recommendations for scientific review boards and IRBs
has already suggested guidelines for investigators who are designing attribute-specific
clinical trials.294 Researchers should not design studies to include only one population
unless there is sufficient reason to believe that only that group will benefit from the
therapy and that other groups are significantly less likely to respond well to it. Thus, the
reasons for such a design must be medical rather than related to a desire for profit or
recruitment shortcuts.
If research is to focus on a particular “race,” investigators must be aware of the
limitations of self-identification and its inaccuracies. Furthermore, researchers should
design studies that carefully control for psychosocial, economic, environmental,
cultural, educational, and other non-biological factors. They must also do everything
possible to obtain meaningful informed consent from subjects who might have limited
educations, reading comprehension levels, and ability to process medical data. The
informed consent process should include disclosure of the inclusion and exclusion
criteria for the research project. Finally, investigators must offer only modest financial
recruitment incentives, if any, so that payments do not become overly enticing and
coercive for economically disadvantaged subjects.
A few words of caution should be added for medical personnel who do not
design studies but employattribute -based therapies in their practices. In order to avoid
potential medical malpractice claims and violation of anti-discrimination mandates,
health care providers should eschew makingtreatment decisions solely based on their
judgment of a patient’s “racial” identity. Precise identification of ancestral origin is
difficult if not impossible to make based on visual observation alone, and efforts to do
so are prone to error. To illustrate, one study analyzed the “racial” designations of
infants who died in their first year of life. The study showed that 4.3 percent of babies
categorized as Black at birth were deemed to be other than Black on their death
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certificates, and thirty-seven percent of those categorized as Native American on their
birth certificates were classified differently on their death certificates.295 The confusion
is often due to the mixed ancestral origins of so many Americans.296 Another study that
asked respondents to identify “ambiguous-race faces” found only a sixty-eight percent
correct identification rate.297
Certainly, physicians should discuss genetic testing for the Tay Sachs allele with
Jewish people who are contemplating having a child and genetic testing for the sickle
cell allele with African-Americans who are considering pregnancy because of the
prevalence of the diseases in these populations. However, physicians should not rely on
the fact that an individual looks Black or Asian in deciding whether to discuss the topic.
Instead, they should ask their patients specific questions about their ancestry.298
Moreover, while one’s ancestry might be relevant to medical care in limited
circumstances, physicians would be misguided to rely on this factor exclusively for most
treatment decisions. Health status and therapeutic responses depend on socio-economic
factors, specific alleles that are shared among all populations, or other elements, not on
the color of one’s skin.299
Health care givers who will use attribute-based medicine must carefully review
current literature and emerging research results so that they understand its subtleties.
Within their areas of expertise, health care providers must be familiar with the factors
that influence health status and treatment response and be able to accurately identify the
attributes at issue in order to best serve their patients.
C. Public Discourse Concerning Attribute-Based Medicine:
The Responsibilities of Investigators, Institutions, and the Media
Scientists, research institutions, and the media must act cautiously and
responsibly in generating public discourse about attribute-based medicine. Medical
professionals and journalists should not convey information that is exaggerated or
inflated. They must not fuel the fires of prejudice and ignorance by reinforcing
stereotypes and misconceptions about biological differences among “races.”
Researchers might be tempted to rush to the media with preliminary,
ambiguous, or questionable research results in order to obtain headlines that will
295
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promote their careers, enhance opportunities for further funding of their projects,300 or
please sponsors who are supporting their studies.301 Investigators have been criticized
for seeking publicity for “hot” research news prematurely302 either for personal gain or
in order to promote “favourable science policy and the financial support required to
sustain costly research facilities.”303 Even if individual researchers are restrained, their
institutions might seek inappropriate media coverage and engage in hyperbole for the
sake of financial and reputational advantage.304
In 2001, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) issued Guidelines for
Ensuring and Maximizing the Quality, Objectivity, Utility, and Integrity of Information
Disseminated by Federal Agencies,305 which require federal agencies to develop
mechanisms to safeguard the “objectivity, utility, and integrity” of the information they
release.306 Thus, if governmental entities are involved in the research and are the ones
to engage in media contact, there is greater likelihood that accuracy will be achieved.
Academic institutions should consider developing similar guidelines to enhance the
integrity of the data conveyed to the public.307
At the same time, the media has been criticized for distortions in its reporting of
scientific information.308 Reporters may not fully understand the data, may oversimplify
research results in order to make them accessible to readers, or may embellish facts in
order to foster readers’ interest.309 The media has also been criticized for reporting
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scientific data before it has been published in peer reviewed journals and thus, prior to
its validation by experts in the field.310 Journalists may report results that they know to
be preliminary, unclear, or dubious as definitive and groundbreaking.311 For example, a
trial that shows that fifty-four percent of Whites responded well to a particular
medication and forty-seven percent of Blacks reacted similarly to it may be reported as
establishing that there are unmistakable and dramatic differences between Whites and
Blacks with respect to the illness at issue and its course of treatment. In order to remain
competitive in the market, journalists may sacrifice a degree of integrity for the sake of
creating dramatic headlines by depicting research results as more promising than they
are or skewing data to exaggerate health risks.312
In the alternative, the media may tailor its reporting to its targeted audience. A
recent study revealed that information about breast cancer was reported differently in
Canadian newspapers known to be read by Jews and those read by other
communities.313 The study found that forty-seven percent of the articles examined in
Jewish newspapers identified genetics as a major risk factor, while only seventeen
percent of stories in newspapers with more general readerships did the same.314 The
authors also found many shortcomings in the way information was conveyed in both
types of newspapers, including inconsistencies, data gaps, and confusing descriptions.315
If the press modifies its stories to appeal to its targeted audience’s presumed concerns
and interests and distorts information, it can cause significant harm by inducing readers
236-38 (2003) (finding that journalists include sensationalistic, absolutist, and dramatic statements in their
stories in order to gain newspaper space).
310
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or viewers to underestimate health risks or undervalue certain medical choices, such as
genetic testing.
Some professional organizations such as the Society of Professional Journalists
and the American Medical Writers Association have developed their own codes of
ethics for journalists writing about science and medicine.316 These include the
principles thatjournalists “should apply objectivity, scientific accuracy and rigor, and
fair balance,”317 that journalists “[t]est the accuracy of information from all sources,”318
and that they “[a]void stereotyping by race” or other classifications.319 Although these
ethical codes are not legally binding, every journalist would be wise to follow them.
Scientists, research institutions, and the media all bear responsibility for
educating the public concerning scientific data.320 If information is distorted to indicate
that there are significant biological differences among “races” and that some “races” are
more diseased than others or less easily treatable, negative and dangerous stereotypes
and prejudices could be reinforced.321 Furthermore, some may feel justified in
discriminating against particular population groups in the workplace or elsewhere based
on allegedly hard data.322 Finally, readers and viewers may make errors in seeking
medical care and making medical choices based on what they believe they have learned
about risks and treatments for their “race.” Consequently, all parties must be restrained
and fastidious about accuracy when discussing scientific information, especially that
which relates to attribute-based research and treatments.323
One additionalarea of concern is direct -to-consumer (DTC) advertising, which
is likely to include advertising concerning “racially-tailored” medications, as they
become available on the market.324 A robust body of literature is emerging concerning
DTCadvertising, 325 and an extensive analysis of this phenomenon is beyond the scope
316
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of this Article. DTC advertising, however, is another arena thatwill need to be carefully
watched and addressed if “race-based” therapies become a force in the marketplace.
VII
CONCLUSION
The medical community is demonstrating a growing interest in “raciallytailored” medical practice and research. “Racially-tailored,” however, is the wrong
concept. To the extent that a group approach is appropriate, health care professionals
should be thinking in terms of attribute-based medicine and taking great care to identify
the relevant attributes correctly. “Race” is a concept with no coherent meaning, and
disease vulnerabilities, the course of illness, and treatment responses do not depend on
the shade of one’s skin color or the texture of one’s hair. Instead, medical professionals
should focus on far more specific questions about ancestry and geographic origin, on
socioeconomic and environmental conditions, on health habits, on factors affecting
treatment compliance, and on specific alleles linked to the condition in question.
Concentrating on the issue of “race” in the therapeutic and research contexts can
lead to medical mistakes, reinforcement of stereotypes, exacerbation of health
disparities, and violation of various anti-discrimination provisions. In the words of one
commentator, “[t]o use the rhetoric of science to sell the idea that historical inequity
should be embraced as biological inevitability is an insult to those who value a common
humanity.”326
In order to guard against the dangers of attribute-based medicine, the FDA and
research institutions should subject clinical studies that target only particular population
groups to extensive scrutiny by scientific review boards and IRBs. Health care
professionals should avoid making treatment decisions based solely on their visual
judgment of a patient’s ancestral origins and should review literature that analyzes all
factors contributing to different disease vulnerabilities and treatment response rates
among patients. Furthermore, researchers, research institutions, and the media, must be
constrained and responsible in communicating scientific data to the public so as not to
reinforce stereotypes and prejudice or induce patients to make misguided decisions
about their own care.
Finally, on a national policy level, policy officials should think carefully about
the resources allocated to the development of attribute-based medicine. As discussed
above, many experts attribute health disparities such as differences in hypertension rates
to non-biological factors, including diet, environment, exercise, and stress.327 While
developing attribute-based drugs might improve treatment for certain patients, it will not
constitute a panacea that will eliminate all health disparities. Consequently, in light of
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limited resources, prudent decisions need to be made concerning funding allocation
between medical research endeavors and other initiatives in the areas of education,
nutrition, environment, and job training that could do more to improve the health status
of disadvantaged minorities.328 Despite the appeal of attribute-based medicine,
resources should not be diverted away from projects intended to diminish
socioeconomic injustice, which are at least as important for those adversely affected by
health disparities.
It is only with careful thought and appropriate precautions that attribute-based
medicine can become an approach that enhances treatment opportunities for all human
beings and contributes significantly to public health and welfare.
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